

CODIAC-D-7  
26 June 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: IAC Committee on Documentation

SUBJECT : External Training Plan for [REDACTED]

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25X1 1. CIA has selected [REDACTED] my Special Assistant, to receive external training at the Western Data Processing Center located on the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles.

2. His objectives are twofold: (a) to obtain an executive's appreciation of the management implications resulting from the development and potential impact of electronic machines on intelligence operations, and (b) to broaden his technical understanding of the operating principles and capabilities of electronic machines which have application to the solution of Agency and interagency intelligence problems.

25X1 3. Although the Agency is sponsoring [REDACTED] training, I view the assignment as being of general IAC interest. I want you to feel, therefore, that [REDACTED] is as much your representative as he is mine. He will be gone a period of 18 months and during that time you are welcome, through CODIAC, to have him investigate automation matters of concern to you on the West Coast. He, in turn, will keep CODIAC advised of new developments which he uncovers.

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4. It is requested that each member of CODIAC submit to me by 1 August 1958 a list of pertinent IAC affiliated contractors and military installations on the West Coast (viz. RAND, Ramo-Wooldridge, Naval Ordnance Test Station, etc.) with which [ ] should become familiar so that I may facilitate his security clearances in advance.

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[ ]

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Paul A. Borel  
Chairman

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CODIAC-D-6  
17 June 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

Intelligence Communications

25X1 1. [ ] Assistant to the DD/I for Planning, has been looking into the problems of expediting the communication of information from the field to headquarters.

2. This is a matter of interest to all intelligence officers; aspects of it are of direct interest to members of CODIAC.

3. Preparatory to a briefing by [ ] at an early CODIAC meeting, we are circulating for your information a draft of his paper on the subject.

Attachment

As stated above.

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DRAFT

17 March 1958

Intelligence Communications and Related Procedures

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The Problem

1. This paper concerns both the mechanical and organizational aspects of intelligence communications from the time that a piece of information is collected until it is in the hands of all of the intelligence analysts in the U.S. Government who need it to carry on the analysis for which they are responsible.
2. It discusses the problem of organizing the communications of the intelligence community as a whole. It is not limited to the communications of the Central Intelligence Agency, although it might be desirable for the C.I.A. to manage a communications system along the lines of this model as a service of common concern.
3. In an activity as large and complex as the intelligence community the problem of transmitting information from collector to user is necessarily a tremendously complicated business. In our present situation the natural complexity is compounded by the process of unplanned evolution from an archaic past of our communications in separate departments and agencies. Rather than examine the present communication system and related organization of the intelligence community, this paper will attempt to construct a model of an ideal system which would take advantage of the advanced technical developments available to us and which would attempt to make the flow of communications keep pace with the increasing speed of world developments and hostile weapons systems.

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4. The model of the communications system outlined in this paper will be opposed by many people on the grounds that: (a) it will require the development and implementation of a vast array of new relationships and new methods of work; (b) it will be expensive as compared to the present direct expenses for rapid communications and courier services; and (c) many of the changes in detail from our present procedures will involve relatively small gains in time saved or increased efficiency and these gains will seem small when compared to the possible disruption of existing work habits.

5. These objections must be met by a recognition that: (a) custom and established habits must not be allowed to inhibit the ability of the intelligence community to be of maximum service to the U.S.; (b) the cost of a truly effective communications continuum would be small in comparison with the expenses resulting from inadequate intelligence, and an increase in direct communications cost might well be balanced by savings in indirect costs; and (c) no single change in our present organization and work procedures can result in any major saving of time or efficiency, but a great many small changes in organization and procedures can result in a great improvement in the intelligence process.

6. The present communications system used by the intelligence community is essentially the same as that used by the U.S. Government in 1900. In that era the few copies of dispatches from abroad required in Washington could be typed in an Embassy and the necessary number of carbon copies forwarded to Washington by ship pouch. The only thing that has changed in this procedure is that we need more copies in

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Washington and, therefore, use stencils instead of carbon paper, and we forward the stencil by air instead of by sea. As a result, there has been a speed-up in the means of transportation but no change in the basic system itself. Dispatches still flow back to Washington to parent departments through many separate channels where distribution is made by mail rooms and secretariats to other interested departments and agencies who in turn route the documents by messenger to subordinate components.

7. In the case of messages transmitted by rapid means there has also been little change in the basic system in the past 50 or 60 years. Messages are still typed, carried to the code room and enciphered, transmitted, deciphered, reproduced, and distributed by messenger to secretariats who make further distribution inside and outside the parent department. The only speed-up in this system has occurred as a result of the development of radio and more efficient teleprinter machines and cipher machines. The message can be sent across the ocean more rapidly than it formerly could be by the cables of 1900 but approximately the same amount of time is consumed in handling it at both ends of the communications system and these are the areas in which the greatest amount of time has usually been consumed.

8. Under the present operating procedures of the intelligence community, we are never able to say what the current situation is in the Soviet Union. On a very small number of items we can say what the situation was yesterday or two or three days ago. On other things we can say what the situation was a week or 10 days ago. On the great

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mass of things, however, we can only say what the situation was two months or three months or six months ago. Many intelligence studies carry a cutoff date which indicates that the conclusions of the paper were the best judgment of the analyst on the basis of the information available to him at that time. The date conceals the fact that the information itself probably was several months old and that the situation actually described was considerably older than the cutoff date on the report.

9. The slowness of our communications systems means that we are heavily dependent upon the judgment of people in the field concerning the importance of specific items of information, since they make the initial judgment concerning the method by which the information will be forwarded to Washington. It happens frequently, therefore, that information comes in by slow means which would have been of considerable importance in the judgment of Washington analysts had it been received by rapid communications in a timely manner.

10. This model of an intelligence communications system is based on these major themes:

- a. connecting all intelligence components in one integrated communications network.
- b. expanding capacity to permit all intelligence to be forwarded by electrical or other means to ensure receipt by the intelligence analyst within twenty-four hours.
- c. mechanizing and simplifying information handling procedures at both ends of the communications system to permit major savings in distribution time.

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The system would supplement, rather than replace, the existing system for handling highly important reports and correspondence now transmitted by cable and radio.

15. With the intelligence community operating at the speed envisaged in this communications system, it would be extremely difficult to maintain current standards of form and appearance for much of the material passing through the system. This is a small price to pay, however, for the increase in timeliness of the substance.

#### Conclusion

16. The construction of a communications system along the line of the model would involve a heavy initial investment in equipment, facilities, and communications personnel. Once in being, its daily operation might

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well be more expensive than the current system. If the same results cannot be achieved by other means, however, the intelligence community may have to face the hard fact, that it must pay the necessary sums to put this model into effect if it is to do the job that it is expected to do for U.S. security.

17. There are many obvious difficulties to inhibit the establishment of a communications system such as that described in this model. None of these difficulties should be insurmountable if there is a determination in the intelligence community to make our knowledge of events affecting the security of the U.S. keep pace with the events themselves.

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